The default mode network (DMN) and semantic network (SN) are two of the most extensively studied systems and both are increasingly used as clinical biomarkers in neurological studies. There are strong theoretical reasons to assume a relationship between the networks, as well as anatomical evidence that they might rely on overlapping cortical regions, such as the anterior temporal lobe (ATL) or angular gyrus (AG). Despite these strong motivations, the relationship between the two systems has received minimal attention.
\body Introduction
Two substantial research literatures, spanning cognitive and clinical neuroscience fields, have been dedicated to exploring the function and components of the semantic network (SN) and the default mode network (DMN). The DMN is an anatomically defined network that shows task-related deactivation during many goal directed tasks (i.e., rest > task) (1) , and can be reliably delineated using techniques such as independent components analysis (ICA) of resting-state fMRI (2) . The SN is a fronto-temporo-parietal network that is sensitive to semantic content in comparisons of semantic tasks > rest/non-semantic control tasks (3) . Although investigations of the DMN and SN have been primarily independent of each other, there are good reasons to compare the two networks directly. First, the networks might share common cognitive functions. One prominent theory suggests that during "rest" the brain is engaged in the activation of rich conceptual representations and thus default mode processing places strong demands on the semantic system (4) . Secondly, the DMN and SN engage some common anatomical areas. The DMN consistently includes medial prefrontal cortex, parietal areas (angular gyrus (AG), precuneus, posterior cingulate cortex (PCC)) and, somewhat more variably, the lateral anterior temporal lobe (ATL) and
hippocampus (1, 5) . Some of these areas are considered central to semantic processing. For instance, both the ATL and AG have been proposed to be "semantic hubs" that help to represent multi-modal semantic representations (6) (7) (8) . However, despite these strong motivations, only a handful of studies have directly compared the two networks and even fewer have (i) utilized methods to maximize the likelihood of detecting ATL activations (9) and (ii) none have compared results across a range of semantic and non-semantic tasks in order to establish the functional generality of each network. Accordingly, we investigated the similarities and differences in the SN and DMN using a large (N=69) distortion-corrected fMRI dataset, spanning a range of semantic and non-semantic tasks that varied the input modality. By comparing the patterns of task-related activation and deactivation, it proved possible to determine when the networks converge and deviate, and to reveal task-and modality-dependent responses in both networks.
Comparison between the DMN and SN is challenging because of apparent inconsistencies in both literatures. The function of the DMN is a hotly-debated issue, with proposed functions including mind-wandering, monitoring the external environment, internally-directed thought, goal-directed thought, thinking about the past or future, or considering alternative perspectives (1, 5, (10) (11) (12) . Furthermore, some sub-components of the DMN, in particular the ATL, are inconsistently reported across studies, leading to suggestions that the DMN might be made up of multiple sub-systems each serving distinct functions (semantic memory, episodic memory, decision making, affective and sensory processing) (5, (13) (14) (15) . The inconsistent involvement of ATL might also relate to a series of methodological challenges associated with imaging this region (9) .
There is also a lack of clarity within the SN literature. For instance, semantic processing typically engages a fronto-temporo-parietal network (3) , however the role of certain regions within the network is currently under debate. A wealth of converging evidence from neuropsychology, TMS, PET and distortion-corrected fMRI suggests that regions within the ATL are crucial in transmodal semantic representation (16-20) However, it is currently unclear as to whether the AG serves a similar function. A meta-analysis of semantic neuroimaging studies found that the AG consistently exhibited sensitivity to semantic manipulations (3) yet the overall AG activation for semantic tasks is often negative with respect to 'rest' (21, 22) . Other evidence is more consistent with a role for dorsal AG/IPS in executive aspects of semantic processing rather than semantic representations per se (23). Secondly, the AG has been implicated in numerous cognitive domains outside of the field of semantic cognition, suggesting a more domain-general cognitive function (attention, episodic memory, numerical processing, syntax: 24). Indeed, one possibility is that the AG forms part of a domain-general processing network that is involved in "automatic" or "stimulus-driven" task-processes and is anti-correlated with the "executive" dorsal parietal cortex (IPS) (24-26). Together these inconsistencies in both the current SN and DMN literatures make establishing the relationship between the two networks difficult.
A clearer picture might emerge through direct, within-study comparisons. In addition to the various factors noted above, the lack of clarity might also relate to a failure of existing studies to take into account task-dependent variations, as the networks' neural responses are likely to vary based on factors such as stimulus-type, modality or taskdifficulty (19, 29-31) -which might be clarified by directly comparing DMN and SN across multiple tasks and modalities. One final limitation of the existing work is the tendency to focus solely on areas of DMN-SN overlap and to ignore any large divergences between the networks. This is important, because if large portions of the SN are not involved in DMN, it questions the core theoretical assumption that the DMN's core function is semantic.
In order to clarify the relationship between the SN and DMN we conducted a largescale investigation of the similarities and differences in the SN and DMN by comparing results from multiple semantic and non-semantic tasks that varied in stimulus-type (words, pictures, environmental sounds, numbers, pattern matching), task-difficulty and inputmodality (visual and auditory). Critically, data were acquired using a distortion-corrected fMRI protocol, promoting detection of signal from all parts of the ATL. By comparing the pattern of task-related activation and deactivation, it was possible to determine where SN and DMN converge and segregate, as well as to reveal task-and modality-dependent responses in the networks. In addition, given their potential pivot role in semantic cognition, we explored the roles of the ATL and AG in more detail.
Results
The DMN was identified by determining areas with greater activation during rest compared to task periods (rest > task). In order to determine semantic-dependent variations in the network, this contrast was performed separately for the semantic and non-semantic tasks, as well as looking for commonalities across all tasks. These analyses revealed semanticvariant and semantic-invariant effects (see Fig.1 appear to vary depending on the semantic content of the task whereas other components are recruited for both task-types.
To determine the SN, we examined task-related activations (task > rest) for the semantic tasks and compared this to the pattern from the non-semantic tasks (see Fig 1) .
Overall, semantic tasks were found to activate a fronto-temporo-parietal network and visual cortex (all semantics > rest). This included anterior and posterior temporal cortex (left fusiform gyrus, left temporal pole, left middle temporal gyrus), frontal areas (bilateral IFG, left precentral gyrus, right middle orbital gyrus), lateral superior parietal cortex (bilateral IPS/SPL), and left putamen. Note that parts of this network, the left ATL (especially fusiform gyrus) and IFG, were deactivated for the non-semantic tasks, thus certain parts of the DMN are sensitive to semantic content. The SN showed some notable differences in activation, as well as some commonalities compared to the non-semantic tasks. Firstly, similar positive activation for the non-semantic tasks (non-semantic > rest) was found in parietal (bilateral IPS, right SMG) and occipital areas, however little frontal and ATL activation was found compared to the semantic tasks (although there was some restricted recruitment of the left temporal pole). Indeed these differences between the semantic and non-semantic tasks were confirmed by conducting direct comparisons (semantic > non-semantic), which revealed significantly stronger recruitment of semantic tasks within bilateral IFG, bilateral ATL (temporal pole and fusiform gyrus), bilateral pMTG, and right middle orbital gyrus. A very small cluster within the left AG also showed a stronger response to the semantic compared to non-semantic tasks, however, this difference was only at a reduced statistical threshold (p < .001, uncorrected) and, unlike the left ATL, reflected differential deactivation (i.e. greater deactivation for the non-semantic vs. semantic tasks).
These analyses provide several key findings. First, they show that certain components of the DMN are common to both semantic and non-semantic tasks, including IPL, medial structures (PCC and medial frontal cortex), as well as right ATL and auditory cortex (although see below). In contrast, other areas of the DMN show task-dependent responses. In particular, left ATL and bilateral IFG, which are positively activated in the semantic task, form part of the DMN during the performance of non-semantic tasks (i.e. they are sensitive to both semantics > rest and rest > non-semantic tasks). Finally, and importantly, the AG and ATL showed dissociable responses. In particular, the left ATL was positively activated for semantic tasks and deactivated for non-semantic tasks, whereas the AG was deactivated by both semantic and non-semantic tasks (albeit moderately more strongly for the non-semantic tasks). Thus, this provides convincing evidence that the ATL and AG serve distinct cognitive functions.
In the next analysis, we investigated whether the SN and DMN vary depending on the type of semantic task. To do this we compared tasks involving written words against pictures (i.e. tasks that share the same modality but differ in verbal vs. non-verbal content; see Figure   2 and Table S1 ). When including only reading-based semantic tasks, the DMN (rest>reading) and the SN (reading>rest) were similar to that revealed by the general semantic analysis described above: the reading-based tasks activated left ATL relative to rest (fusiform gyrus and temporal pole) but deactivated right ATL. However, the pattern was different for the picture-based semantic tasks, which showed bilateral positive ATL activation (temporal pole and fusiform gyrus) and comparatively little ATL deactivation in either hemisphere. Direct contrasts between reading-and picture-based semantic tasks confirmed that picture tasks showed stronger bilateral ATL engagement (fusiform and inferior temporal gyrus), as well as occipital areas (see Figure S1 ). In contrast, reading-based tasks engaged left IFG, left pMTG, bilateral superior frontal gyrus, and right hippocampus more strongly compared to picture tasks. Note that the AG showed significant deactivation for both task types, with no significant differences between the two. The medial structures (PCC and medial frontal cortex) were also equivalently deactivated for both tasks. Therefore, these results combined with those from the more general analysis above, clearly demonstrate that, unlike 'core DMN regions' (PCC, medial frontal and AG), the ATL is involved in both SN and DMN but its recruitment varies depending on stimulus-type.
The influence of input modality was also investigated to examine modality-dependent and modality-independent responses. In the first overall analysis, auditory cortex was found to form part of the DMN (and this was common regardless of the semantic nature of the task). Previous evidence has shown that sensory areas are deactivated when they are not central to task performance (29), and thus we expected that this effect would be modality dependent, driven mainly by tasks from the visual modality (the majority of tasks). To test this prediction, we separately examined the results for the visual and auditory semantic tasks (see Figure 2 ). Our predictions were confirmed: the tendency for auditory cortex to form part of the DMN was driven by the visual tasks (rest >visual tasks). When including only the auditory tasks (rest > auditory tasks), the sensory-cortices included in the DMN shifted to include parts of visual rather than auditory cortex. This difference was significant in a direct comparison between the two networks. We also examined areas that were invariant to input modality by conducting a conjunction analysis across visual and auditory semantic tasks.
This showed that for the DMN, bilateral ventral parietal cortex (AG, SMG), medial structures (PCC and medial frontal cortex), right ATL and left superior orbital gyrus were common to visual and auditory tasks (rest>visual AND rest>auditory). Whereas for the SN, the left ATL, pMTG, and IPS were common (visual>rest AND auditory>rest).
The analyses reported above confirm that the ATL and AG show a different pattern of activation (and deactivation) to semantic and non-semantic tasks. To examine the relationship between these areas further, the percent signal change from each region was correlated across tasks. We also examined the relationship between these regions and the IPS, an area that may form an anti-correlated network with the AG (26). Consistent with their profile on the taskbased results, the correlation analysis showed no significant relationship between the responses of AG and ATL (r = -0.34, p = .18), providing further evidence that these regions respond dissimilarly. In contrast, a strong negative correlation between IPS and AG was found (r = -0.64, p = .006), consistent with the proposal that the AG and IPS are anticorrelated networks. Additionally, there was positive trend in the correlation between ATL and IPS activation (r = 0.45, p = .07). Finally, we examined the extent to which activation in each area varied depending on task difficulty by correlating percent signal change with the average RT for the same task. This showed that the AG was negatively correlated with task difficulty (r = -.612, p = .04), whereas the IPS showed a trend towards a moderate positive correlation (r = .55, p = .08), and the ATL showed a positive but non-significant relationship (r = .51, p = .11).
Discussion
The aim of this large-scale (69 participant, multi-task) investigation was to clarify the relationship between the DMN and SN. The results indicate that both networks are highly task-and modality-dependent (see summary Table 1 ). Certain DMN areas are sensitive to the semantic nature of the task. Specifically, the involvement of ATL regions in the DMN (and left IFG to some extent) was found to vary depending on the level of semantic involvement (semantic vs. non-semantic) and semantic stimulus-type (pictures vs. written words). In particular these areas were positively activated during semantic tasks but were deactivated during non-semantic task performance, and hence form a part of the DMN only for nonsemantic tasks. Activation in other areas was independent of task but was instead influenced by input modality or task-difficulty. Specifically, primary sensory cortices were deactivated for tasks presented in their non-specialised modality. In contrast, the AG was insensitive to both modality and task, but was more strongly deactivated for more difficult tasks.
Given that both ATL and AG have been proposed as potentially critical regions for the DMN or SN, the second aim of this study was to compare responses in the ATL and AG across tasks. The results showed that the AG and ATL responded very differently to each task, thus implying distinct cognitive functions. In particular, the polarity of activation in the ATL depended on semantic content; it was positively activated for semantic tasks and deactivated for non-semantic tasks (with laterality varying depending on stimulus-type). In contrast, the AG was deactivated by all tasks with the degree of deactivation relating to taskdifficulty rather than semantic content per se. Indeed, direct correlations between the AG and ATL activity found no evidence of a significant relationship between the two areas. The AG, unlike the ATL, also showed an inverse relationship with the extent of IPS activation, an area considered central to the "multiple demand" executive processing system (25, 32)
The current data might have strong implications for interpretation of networks identified in resting state functional connectivity studies (as revealed by inter-regional correlations, independent component analysis, etc.). It is understandably the case that the occurrence of positive correlations in functional connectivity between regions is interpreted as evidence of a common underlying cognitive function. For instance, functional connectivity between the ATL, AG and frontal cortices has been interpreted as evidence of a semantic processing network (33) . However, the current data generate a second alternative hypothesis which can be explored in future studies (e.g., by careful deconstruction of the networkcomponents observed in task-dependent ICA: cf.(34)). Specifically, the ATL and AG did not show common activation for semantic tasks but rather common deactivation during nonsemantic task performance. Accordingly, positive inter-regional time-course correlations might not reflect a common interest in semantic tasks but rather a common "disinterest" in the tasks which deactivate both regions. If correct, one must be cautious in interpreting the results from connectivity studies alone. Indeed, the current study highlights how cognitive interpretation and fractionation of a distributed network can be aided by combining data from experimentally-driven task-based investigations.
The current results suggest that when a neural region is not critical to task function it is deactivated. This was true across a variety of structures and processes. For instance, auditory areas were deactivated during visual processing (and vice versa) and semantic areas were deactivated during the performance of non-semantic tasks. These findings are consistent with two proposals about neural activation. The first is the "limited capacity" model of neural processing, in which neural resources are finite and thus alternative cognitive processes are competitive in nature (35) . Under these circumstances, the most efficient strategy is to down-regulate a particular neural system if it is unnecessary/disruptive to task performance.
Therefore according to this hypothesis, the changing task-dependencies within DMN areas can be explained by variations in the neural computations required for a particular task. The second potentially-related proposal is that there are online plasticity mechanisms to balance metabolic energy consumption against task performance (36) . Thus if a region's neurocomputational function is not required for the current task, its activity is down-regulated in order to save metabolic energy.
By combining data across a variety of different semantic and non-semantic tasks we were able to clarify the relationship between the DMN and SN. The overlap was particularly clear for regions within the ATL. These data are consistent with a convergence of results from neuropsychology, TMS, functional neuroimaging and intracranial recordings, which points to these ATL regions underpinning a transmodal semantic representational hub (7, 8, 16, 20, 37) . This outcome is highly consistent with the "semantic hypothesis" for the DMN.
Although originally proposed for the AG rather than ATL, this hypothesis suggests that during 'rest' the brain is engaged in detailed conceptual-language processes that draw on the semantic network (4). The response characteristics of the ATL fit perfectly with this hypothesis. It does not seem to hold, however, for other parts of the DMN (including the AG) -many of which are insensitive to the semantic demands of the task and are, instead, influenced by modality or task-difficulty.
The current study strongly suggests that rather than serving one single cognitive function, the DMN is best viewed as a dynamic patchwork reflecting variable deactivation of several subsystems, each serving distinct computations. Indeed, this view is consistent with recent claims that the DMN consists of multiple dissociable but interacting components that serve a variety of cognitive function (semantic memory, episodic memory, decision making, affective and sensory processing) (5, (13) (14) (15) . In short, whilst the DMN network is a relatively consistent neuroimaging phenomenon (reproducible across a range of imaging data and types of analysis: cf. [7] ), it would appear that it is not a coherent, homogeneous cognitive entity.
In addition to the DMN, this study has implications for semantic models. Some theories propose that the AG is a semantic hub, with a function akin to the ATL (3, 6) . The results from this study, however, show that the AG and ATL exhibit very different responses across tasks. Whilst the brain has multiple tertiary association cortices (indeed both the ATL and AG have been shown to rank amongst the highest functionally interconnected areas (38) ), the current data provide convincing evidence that the ATL and AG serve distinct cognitive functions. These data, combined with the wealth of converging evidence from neuropsychology, fMRI and TMS provides compelling support for the core role of the ATL, rather than AG, in semantic representation. Although the current data do not exclude the possibility that the AG is involved in semantic processing in some way, at the very least these results show that the AG does not perform a similar role to the ATL in semantic cognition.
The current results showed that the left ATL was positively engaged during all semantic tasks, whereas the right ATL was sensitive to the stimulus-type with pictures generating positive activation whereas written words led to deactivation. This adds to a growing literature comparing processing in the left vs. right ATL. A seminal MEG study of semantic processing across modalities as well as a recent large-scale meta-analysis of functional imaging studies (37, 39) found that ATL activation for written words or speech production is strongly left-lateralised, whereas other forms of semantic tasks (pictures, auditory words, and auditory sounds) show bilateral ATL engagement (see also 19). These and parallel neuropsychological data on left vs. right ATL differences, have been formally considered in a number implemented computational models of semantic processing (40, 41) .
The key ideas from these models are that semantic representation may be supported by regions within the ATLs, bilaterally, with differential patterns of activation or impairments in unilateral ATL patients arising from the effects of asymmetric connectivity with input and output areas. Thus the relatively greater importance of the left ATL for spoken tasks and for written-word comprehension would follow from differentially-higher connectivity to lefthemisphere biased speech productions systems (cf. 42) and left posterior ventral occipitotemporal cortex which exhibits greater involvement in the visual processes that underpin written word recognition (43) . An alternative hypothesis is that each ATL supports discrete semantic functions (44) . Irrespective of the exact cognitive interpretation, this finding has a strong methodological implication for the current semantic neuroimaging literature. By far the most commonly-used form of stimulus in semantic fMRI studies is the written word. Whilst this has obvious practical and logistic advantages (visual presentation of stimuli is much easier than auditory in the scanner, and written words allow the full range of concrete, abstract, emotion, etc., concepts to be probed), it is clear that written words unlike pictures, spoken words and sounds generates a strongly left-lateralised pattern of activation.
This could encourage the apparent conclusion that semantic processing is predominately leftlateralised when, in fact, for all modalities other than written words it appears to be much more bilateral in form.
The medial structures (PCC and medial frontal cortex) and AG were found to be deactivated by all task-types. This is consistent with observations that these regions form the most reliable and highly connected components of the DMN (5, 38, 45) and are considered to be core parts of the DMN (45) . The medial structures are particular active in tasks involving autobiographical memory, theory of mind and episodic memory retrieval leading to suggestions that they may be involved in self-projection (projecting oneself to a different context) or internal mentation (self-directed thought) (10, 12) .
Finally, the question remains as to the core computation of the AG. The current data showed that: (1) the AG is deactivated by semantic and non-semantic tasks, and the magnitude of deactivation relates to task-difficulty; and (2) . Thus it appears that the AG serves a more domain-general function and is not specialised for semantic processing. One possibility is that the parietal cortex acts as a multi-modal online buffer of incoming internal or external information (24). Within this system the dorsal and ventral parietal cortex serve counterpointed roles; the ventral system automatically buffers input whereas the dorsal system is involved in top-down executive processing of buffered information. Indeed, this is consistent with evidence for the role of the parietal cortex in working and short-term memory (47) . According to this theory, the continual automatic buffering of additional information by the ventral parietal cortex can be disruptive during the performance of some but not all goaldirected executively-demanding tasks. Hence, during difficult task performance activation of this region is suppressed.
Methods
Tasks: Data were collected from 7 semantic tasks plus modality-and RT-matched nonsemantic tasks from across four fMRI studies (N = 69). Each study included at least one semantic condition and one non-semantic control condition from the same modality. The tasks are described in detail elsewhere (17-19, 48) however crucially for the present study, the paired semantic/non-semantic tasks varied in stimulus-type and modality; picture tasks (×2), written word tasks (×3), auditory word tasks (×1), and environmental sounds tasks (×1) (see Table 2 ).
Scanning: Images were acquired on a 3T Philips Achieva scanner using an 8 element SENSE head coil with a sense factor of 2.5. The data from each study were collected using the same distortion-corrected fMRI technique (see Supplementary Material Table S2 for individual study parameters). Following the standard method for distortion-corrected spinecho fMRI (49) , the images were acquired with a single direction k space traversal and a leftright phase encoding direction. A "pre-scan" was acquired before each run, consisting of 10 volumes of dual direction k space traversal SE EPI scans. This provided 10 pairs of images matching the functional time series but with distortions in both phase encoding directions (10 left-right and 10 right-left). These scans were used in the distortion correction procedure. The correction was computed using the method reported by (49) in which each image from functional time-series is registered to the mean of the pre-scan images using a 6-parameter rigid-body transformation. Subsequently, a spatial transformation matrix is calculated from the pre-scan images, consisting of the spatial re-mapping necessary to correct the distortion.
This transformation was then applied to each of the co-registered functional images.
Analyses: Using SPM5, data were motion-corrected and co-registered to the anatomical T1. Images were then spatially normalised to MNI standard space, resampled to 3 Figure S1 . The direct contrast of picture tasks and reading tasks showing greater right ATL activation (fusiform and inferior temporal gyrus) for the picture tasks (red = pictures > reading, blue = reading > pictures (uncorrected, p < .001)). 
